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Carbon farming in its various forms has the potential to deliver a range of ecosystem services 
in addition to climate regulation. In Australia, the main public ‘co-benefits’ that could result 
from carbon farming are conservation of biodiversity, increases in soil and water quality, and 
economic and cultural services for Indigenous communities. While there is a lack of 
empirical evidence that carbon farming is delivering these ecosystem services to date, various 
metrics have been developed by researchers and through other payment for ecosystem 
services schemes that may enable effective targeting of these co-benefits. In this article, we 
review previous studies and schemes and identify four main approaches for metrics that could 
be applied to carbon farming in Australia: (1) spatial modelling, (2) benchmarks; (3) 
environmental benefit indices; and (4) indicators. The relative value of each of these 
approaches varies, depending on the objectives of policy-makers. Spatial modelling and 
benchmarks can play a key role in decision support systems for landholders who may be 
interested in carbon farming. Indices are valuable for the development of new or modified 
market-based schemes that weigh up different co-benefits. Indicators are critical for outcome-
based payment schemes and for verifying the effectiveness of co-benefit policies overall. 
 









1. Current availability of data on co-benefits of carbon farming is low 
2. Spatial models, indirect indicators and benchmarks can assist with decision support 
3. Indices could be employed in new or adapted market-based co-benefit schemes 
4. Activity-based indicators can be used to link actions and proxies to predicted outcomes 










An important emerging area of practice and policy development relating to ecosystem services 
is the management of vegetation to sequester carbon.  Australia has been a key site of carbon 
market development within the Oceania region1 in areas of compliance, public payment and 
private voluntary markets (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2015), and it has emerged as a global 
leader around policy innovation to incentivise the management of native vegetation and soils 
to sequester carbon (often referred to as ‘carbon farming’).   
 
Many carbon farming practices, including human-induced regeneration, active tree planting, 
avoided deforestation and fire management, also offer the potential to provide a range of 
additional ecosystem services aside from climate regulation (Berkessy & Wintle, 2008; Lin et 
al., 2013; Bryan et al., 2014; Evans, 2018). These outcomes are often termed ‘co-benefits’ 
(Mayrhofer and Gupta, 2016) and, in the case of carbon farming, can cut across each of the 
four ecosystem services categories outlined by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.   
 
Maynard et al (this issue) highlights the need to draw global attention towards environmental 
and socio-economic issues affecting the Oceania region, and to the consequences of policies 
and management relating to ecosystem services and the well-being of people of the region. In 
this regard, this article provides an overview of ecosystem services markets, including 
approaches and metrics relevant for quantifying, incentivising and understanding trade-offs 
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draws on various approaches and metrics developed through previous research into co-benefits, 
or applied in other Australian payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes. In doing so it 
seeks to enhance understanding of current knowledge and policy gaps associated with 
measuring and incentivising the potential of co-benefits of carbon farming.   
 
The next section set the scene on co-benefits of carbon farming, and the use of approaches for 
metrics, explaining the policy environment for Australian carbon farming. Section 2  reviews 
previous studies on the potential co-benefits of carbon farming in Australia and it identifies 
various metrics they have developed or proposed. Section 3 then reviews the metrics used in 
other Australian market-based schemes, before discussing in Section 4 how different metrics 
could be applied to carbon farming in Australia. The objectives set make carbon researchers, 
natural resource managers and policy-makers new to ecosystem services concepts or 
unfamiliar with Australia the target audience.   
 
1.1 Understanding carbon farming ecosystem services and co-benefits 
The co-benefits of carbon biosequestration may include supporting, regulating, provisioning 
and cultural services, and be either private or public in nature (Lin et al., 2013; Cowie et al., 
2019). Private benefits to landholders may include additional income streams (Cockfield et al., 
2019), productivity increases (Cunningham et al. 2015), savings of time, money or resources 
as a result of improved ecosystem service delivery (e.g. decreased need for pesticide 
application), and non-financial benefits such as improved aesthetics (Kragt et al., 2016). Other 
co-benefits are public goods, including environmental benefits relating to biodiversity 
conservation, soil and water quality, and cultural benefits such as Indigenous community 
development (Fig. 1). These public co-benefits are the focus of this article, as their public-good 
nature provides a key reason for governments to incentivise their delivery. 





Fig. 1. Potential environmental and socio-economic co-benefits of carbon farming in addition 
to climate regulation. Source: The Carbon Market Institute (2017) and literature review from 
Sections 2 and 3. 
In Australia, the term ‘carbon farming’ is commonly applied to vegetation, soil and fire 
management practices aimed at sequestering or avoiding the release of carbon. This 
terminology was given official recognition under the Australian Government’s Carbon 
Farming Initiative (CFI), which formed part of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism that existed 
from 2011 to 2014. The CFI enabled landholders to earn credits for sequestration on their land 
and sell them to entities wishing to offset their emissions. The Carbon Pricing Mechanism was 
replaced in 2014 by the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF), under which the Australian 
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Government acts as a single buyer of emissions reduction credits via an auction mechanism. A 
number of CFI methodologies relating to vegetation management were incorporated into the 
ERF in 2015. Despite the fact that the CFI no longer exists, the ‘carbon farming’ terminology 
lives on amongst researchers (e.g. Dumbrell et al., 2016; Morán-Ordóñez et al., 2017; Evans, 
2018), policy-makers (e.g. Butler et al. 2014) and advocacy groups such as the Carbon Farmers 
of Australia and the Carbon Market Institute. 
 
The most widespread carbon farming method employed under the ERF to date is human-
induced regeneration (HIR), often referred to as assisted natural regeneration outside of 
Australia (e.g. Evans, 2018). This involves facilitating the natural regrowth of trees and shrubs 
through grazing management and other practices, and is concentrated in the rangelands of 
northwest New South Wales (NSW) and southwest Queensland (Evans 2018). Other ERF 
methods referred to as carbon farming include avoided deforestation (i.e. agreeing not to 
undertake tree-clearing that would otherwise be permitted), environmental plantings (i.e. direct 
planting of mixed native species), mallee eucalypt plantings, farm forestry and plantation 
forestry, savanna burning, and sequestering carbon in soils in grazing systems  (Department of 
the Environment and Energy, 2019). 
 
While the delivery of co-benefits from carbon farming has the potential to provide additional 
payments to landholders for the ecosystem services they are providing, barriers for adoption 
include a lack of effective market mechanisms, and of processes for measurement and 
verification. Evans (2018) argues that there is little incentive to monitor and report co-benefits 
of carbon farming. As a consequence, availability of data and information is low, hampering 
public and government understanding and knowledge around the co-benefits that carbon 
farming is delivering.  Scarcity of data and information also hinders the ability to estimate risks 
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associated with ‘dis-benefits’ or declines in ecosystem services that carbon farming can 
produce. Some of these risks, such as biodiversity loss if monocultures replace diverse habitats, 
and plantations impacting on water yield in regulated catchments, have been addressed within 
ERF methodologies (Butler et al., 2016), while others require further research, such as the risk 
that invasive native scrub may contribute to biodiversity- and soil-degradation at HIR sites 
(Waters et al., 2017; Cowie et al., 2019). 
 
Market-based mechanisms such as Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes require at 
least one ‘seller’ and one ‘buyer’ who are able to enter into an exchange of a ‘well-defined’ 
ecosystem service or a land use activity likely to secure that service (Wunder, 2005). This 
requirement for services or activities to be ‘well-defined’ has resulted in a range of metrics 
applied across various PES schemes in Australia. The term metric is used here in a broad 
sense to refer to any ‘system or standard of measurement’, with other terms, including 
benchmarks, indicators, indices, models and proxies, used to refer to specific systems or 
approaches to measuring ecosystem services (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Terms relating to the measurement of ecosystem services used in this article 
Term Definition (Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2019) 
Metric A system or standard of measurement 
Benchmark A point of reference, especially one from which 
measurements may be made 
Indicator That which serves to indicate or give a suggestion of 
something (including for prediction of future outcomes or 
trends) 
ACCEPTED VERSION (Accepted for publication in Ecosystem Services 26 July 2019) 
 
 9 
Index A number or formula expressing some property, form, 
ratio, etc. of the thing in question 
Model A simplified or idealized description or conception of a 
particular system, situation, or process 
Proxy A variable that can be used as an indirect estimate of 
another variable with which it is correlated 
 
Approaches for metrics applied to ecosystem services can be direct or indirect, quantitative or 
qualitative, and be predictive or measured after management practices have been 
implemented. For example, indicators, benchmarks and models may be either qualitative or 
quantitative, whereas an index necessarily requires a quantitative approach. Similarly, while 
indicators, benchmarks and indices may involve direct or indirect measurement, proxies and 
models imply an indirect approach. Metrics may focus on outcomes (outcome-based or 
performance-based), or on actions that are assumed to be linked to desired outputs (activity-
based or input-based). 
  
Stakeholders (e.g. government, finance and industry, carbon service providers, farmers, 
Indigenous communities, Natural Resource Managers) may have differing needs for the types 
of approaches and metrics defined in Table 1. Both buyers and sellers in a PES scheme have 
a need to ensure that the quantity of services being delivered (or likely to be delivered) is 
commensurate with the payment being made.  
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1.2 Markets related to carbon farming in Australia 
Carbon markets have gained momentum worldwide since 1992 when the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change designated them as one of its main policy 
instruments to mitigate anthropogenic climate change. The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
in 2007 led to substantial carbon market development and modification in Australia (Fig. 2). 
This included the use of fixed-price permits with offsetting options between 2011 and 2014, 
with this scheme repealed prior to its intended transition to a cap-and-trade system and replaced 
by the auction-based ERF (Baumber, 2016). The ERF was given an initial budget of AUD 2.55 
billion in 2015 that was extended by a further AUD 2 billion in February 2019 (Clean Energy 
Regulator, 2019a). 
 
Fig. 2. Timeline of key carbon market developments in Australia 
 
The ERF is a ‘baseline and credit’ scheme, under which entities can generate carbon abatement 
credits by developing projects that reduce emissions below (or sequester carbon above) a 
baseline scenario (Kollmuss et al. 2008). Under the ERF, the Australian Government acts as a 
single buyer of carbon abatement via a ‘reverse auction’ process that involves multiple 
potential suppliers of abatement bidding to sell abatement to the government for the lowest 
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price. The credits awarded to successful bidders are known as Australian carbon credit units 
(ACCUs). While baselines of business as usual are used to ensure additionality (i.e. that credit 
is only earned for abatement that would not have happened anyway), Burke (2016) questions 
whether this has been effective, arguing that many of the projects funded are actions that would 
have happened anyway without ERF funding. 
 
While the ERF covers a range of activities and sectors (e.g. vegetation management, livestock 
management, fertilisers, transport, energy efficiency, landfill and waste), vegetation 
management accounted for 57% of ERF projects (522 out of 912) and 54% of total ACCUs 
issued as of 29 March 2019 (Clean Energy Regulator, 2019b). Savanna burning accounts for 
another 8% of projects (10% of ACCUs) and soil carbon in grazing systems account for 5% of 
projects (but less than 0.001% of ACCUs due to the early stage of many projects). Of the 
vegetation management methodologies, human induced regeneration (HIR) includes the 
greatest number of projects (Fig. 3) and avoided deforestation (AD) has the greatest number of 
ACCUs issued. However, comparing ACCUs issued for different methodologies can be 
misleading, as AD projects have ACCUs issued annually, while HIR projects have ACCUs 
issued at the end of each five-year reporting period (Clean Energy Regulator 2018). 




Fig. 3. Projects established and Australian carbon credit units (ACCUs) issued for vegetation 
management, savanna burning and soil carbon in grazing systems under the ERF. Source: 
Clean Energy Regulator (2019b). Note: ‘Plantings’ incorporates methodologies for 
reforestation, afforestation, environmental plantings, mallee plantings, plantations and farm 
forestry. 
 
As shown in Fig. 4, ERF vegetation projects have been concentrated in the rangelands of NSW, 
Queensland and Western Australia (WA), while savanna burning projects are concentrated in 
the tropical north of Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. 
 




Fig. 4. Emissions Reduction Fund projects registered in each of Australia’s states. The size of 
each pie chart represents the number of projects, and the coloured segments in each pie chart 
represent the percentage breakdown of methods used in each state, and correspond with the 
methods legend (lower left corner). Source: Clean Energy Regulator (2019b). Insets (1) to (5) 
showcase spatial distribution of projects related to savanna burning and vegetation 
management (lower right legend), black polygons are revoked projects. Source: 
www.nationalmap.gov.au Clean energy regulator area-based ERF projects layer.   
 
The ERF does not specifically account for, or place an economic value on, the co-benefits of 
carbon farming. However, some of the ERF supporting material acknowledges and promotes 
these co-benefits, such as the guidance on human-induced regeneration that highlights 
‘additional benefits’ such as ‘improved quality of your land and water supply, increased 
biodiversity and shade and shelter for stock’ (Clean Energy Regulator, 2018). 
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The ERF represents a ‘public payment’ PES scheme approach, with the Australian Government 
as the sole buyer of carbon sequestration services (Madsen et al., 2010; Mercer et al., 2011). 
However, while the ERF is the dominant source of demand for ACCUs, accounting for over 
95% of demand, there is a broader ACCU market that involves other buyers (Clean Energy 
Regulator 2019a). This includes entities covered by the Safeguard mechanism, a compliance-
driven scheme that requires liable entities to purchase offsets if their emissions exceed a set 
benchmark. Voluntary transactions are also made by private entities wishing to offset their 
emissions. State and territory governments represent a growing source of demand for ACCUs, 
driven by commitments to offset emissions for specific activities such as desalination plants 
and vehicle fleet emissions (Clean Energy Regulator 2019a). Government purchases of this 
nature are ‘voluntary’ in the sense that they are not being made to comply with regulatory 
obligations, but are often classed as ‘public payments’ to distinguish them from private 
voluntary payments for ecosystem services (Madsen et al., 2010; Mercer et al., 2011).  
 
The National Carbon Offset Standard, developed by the Australian Government, helps to 
facilitate trade in a number of eligible offsets units (ACCUs, Golds Standard, Verified 
Carbon Standard) outside of the ERF, by verifying carbon credits from various sources.  The 
Australia's Carbon Marketplace website (Carbon Market Institute, 2019)  and the Australia’s 
Clean Energy Regulator have developed interactive maps using data published on the ERF 
project register. ACCUs sold on the private market have been reported to sell at a price 
premium compared to ERF auction prices, with the spot price on the private market at 1 
March 2019 being AUD 15.35, compared with an average price of AUD 13.87 per tonne of 
abatement for the previous ERF auction in December 2018 (Clean Energy Regulator 2019a). 
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2. Review of approaches and metrics from Australian carbon farming co-benefit studies 
Through review of relevant literature this section identifies the co-benefits most commonly 
reported in Australian carbon farming studies, as well as metrics and associated approaches 
that have been developed or proposed for measuring co-benefits. The methodology involved 
first identifying academic articles on carbon sequestration co-benefits in Australia as of June 
2019 using the Web of Science database. The keywords used were ‘carbon farming’, ‘carbon 
sequestration’ and ‘co-benefits’, with searches then refined using ‘Australia’. Articles were 
only included if they: 
a) focused on Australia,  
b) discussed the management of carbon stocks in vegetation or soils as the primary land 
use activity,  
c) discussed benefits other than climate regulation, and  
d) discussed public benefits.  
Additional literature was identified through citations in reviewed articles and through 
personal networks, especially with regards to ‘grey’ literature such as government reports. 
 
2.1 Potential co-benefits of carbon farming in Australia 
A range of potential co-benefits from carbon farming have been identified in recent 
Australian studies (Table 2). Biodiversity is by far the most commonly cited co-benefit, 
followed by soil quality, salinity and Indigenous economic and cultural benefits. Further 
details of each study reviewed are provided in the Supplementary Material. The most relevant 
articles are discussed hereafter, specifically those that relate to the most common carbon 
farming practices in Australia, human-induced regeneration (HIR) avoided deforestation 
(AD), and those that employ metrics that could be used to measure and promote co-benefits. 
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Table 2. Co-benefits identified and approaches and metrics employed across 29 recent 
studies discussing the co-benefits of carbon farming in Australia 
Practices, co-benefits and methods featured No. of studies 
Carbon farming 
practices 
Permanent plantings (monocultures and/or 
mixed-species) 
23 
Plantation or farm forestry 3 
Human-induced regeneration 5 
Avoided deforestation 4 
Savanna burning 6 
Soil carbon management (e.g. stubble 




(in addition to 
climate regulation) 
Regulating 
Salinity mitigation 6 
Water quality (e.g. 
sediment/nutrient levels) 
3 
Soil health (e.g. erosion 
control, soil quality)g 
6 
Supporting 
Habitat for biodiversity 21 
Nutrient cycling 1 
Provisioning 
Food production 2 
Fuel production 1 
Fibre (wool) production 2 
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metrics used to 
identify and analyse 
co-benefits 
Qualitative 




Spatial modelling 4 
Other modelling (e.g. 
economics, biomass growth, 
biodiversity value, fire 
regimes) 
7 
Indicators for co-benefits 
(applied or proposed) 
2 
Indices 1 
Co-benefits theorised from previous studies 
(no metric developed or proposed) 
12 
 
The summary data in Table 2 reinforces Evans’ (2018) argument that quantifying co-benefits 
remains as a significant barrier to adoption . Almost all of the studies reviewed relied on either 
modelling based on other land uses with similarities to carbon farming (Flugge and Abadi, 
2006; Renwick et al. 2014; Cunningham et al. 2015; Russell-Smith et al. 2015; Evans et al. 
2015; Bryan et al. 2016; Doran-Browne et al. 2016), stakeholder perceptions of co-benefits 
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(Robinson et al., 2011; Dumbrell et al., 2016; Kragt et al., 2016; Torabi et al. 2016; Robinson 
et al., 2016; Kragt et al., 2017) or theorised benefits based on previous studies (Fensham and 
Guymer, 2009; Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists, 2011; George et al., 2012; Mitchell 
et al., 2012; Bradshaw et al., 2013; Net Balance Foundation, 2014;  Bryan et al., 2014;  Standish 
& Hulvey, 2014; Walsh et al., 2014;  Cunningham et al., 2015;  Nolan et al., 2018, Evans et 
al., 2018). Studies such as Renwick et al. (2014) measured carbon sequestration, but did not 
quantify other ecosystem services; whereas Perry et al. (2016) measured biodiversity, though 
not specifically at sites under carbon farming practices.  Furthermore, Table 2 highlights the 
paucity of studies on HIR and AD. Of the 29 studies reviewed, five discussed HIR (Butler et 
al. 2014; Evans 2015; Kragt et al. 2016; Evans 2018; Nolan et al. 2018) and four covered AD 
(Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists, 2011; Butler et al., 2014; Evans 2018; Nolan et al. 
2018).  
 
The dominant focus of the studies reviewed is tree-planting activities, including both mixed-
species (i.e. environmental plantings) and monocultures of fast-growing species. This contrasts 
with arguments that human-induced regeneration is more likely to provide diverse and resilient 
ecosystems than direct tree planting (Fensham & Guymer, 2009; Evans, 2015; Lindenmayer et 
al., 2012), and that avoided deforestation should be prioritised because the area deforested in 
Australia is much higher than the area reforested each year (van Oosterzee, 2012). In terms of 
direct tree-planting, mixed-species environmental plantings are more likely to provide 
biodiversity co-benefits than monocultures (Lin et al., 2013; Munro et al. 2009), although 
plantations can provide habitat value when established on previously cleared land (e.g. Loyn, 
2007; Smith, 2009; Felton et al. 2010; Kavanagh and Stanton, 2012; Law et al., 2013). The 
biodiversity value of regrowth and assisted regeneration sites depends on factors such as land 
use history, the dimensions of the site and the composition of species that regenerate (Hall et 
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al., 2012). Key land use history factors that can impact on biodiversity include the degree of 
soil disturbance (e.g. grazing vs mechanical cultivation), the number of times that a site has 
been cleared, and the time lag between clearing and regeneration (Doherty, 1998).  
 
Six of the 29 studies reviewed (Russell-Smith et al., 2015; Walsh et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 
2011; Bradshaw et al., 2013; Perry et al., 2016; Moran-Ordonez et al. 2017) focus on the 
practice of savanna burning in Northern Australia. It emerges that low-intensity, early-season 
burns maintain carbon and reduce non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions by minimizing the 
amount of fuel burnt in large-scale, high-intensity late-season wildfires. The practice is 
considered to be generally commensurate with biodiversity conservation objectives as well as 
Indigenous cultural practice (Andersen et al. 2012; Moran-Ordonez et al. 2017). Three of the 
studies explicitly consider soil carbon increases in cropping and/or grazing systems (Dumbrell 
et al. 2016: Kragt et al. 2016; Kragt et al. 2017), including co-benefits for soil health, 
biodiversity and agricultural productivity (i.e. provisioning services). 
 
2.2 Approaches and metrics that have been developed to assess carbon farming co-benefits 
Of the 29 studies reviewed in Table 2, 11 involved some form of modelling, most commonly 
using spatial data. A case in point is Bryan et al.’s (2014) study that used principles of 
complementarity, connectivity and representation of plant species compositional diversity to 
identify priority locations for targeting mixed-species carbon plantings aimed at enhancing 
biodiversity. Carwardine et al. (2015) and Robinson et al. (2016) each prioritised areas that 
had less than 30% of their original vegetation remaining for the establishment of mixed-
species carbon plantings. Moran-Ordonez et al. (2017) identified priority sites for savanna 
fire management in northern Australia, based on how many different species and 
communities occur there and the relative rarity of those species and communities. Other 
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modelling approaches focused on biomass growth rates and carbon sequestration (Renwick et 
al. 2014; Doran-Browne et al. 2016), economic modelling (Evans et al. 2015; Bryan et al. 
2016), recharge rates affecting salinity (Flugge and Abadi, 2006), modelling of fire regimes 
(Russell-Smith et al. 2015) and a conceptual model for managing trade-offs between carbon, 
biodiversity and water impacts (Cunningham et al. 2015). 
 
Three of the studies reviewed focus on the development of quantitative indicators or indices, 
all in relation to biodiversity. Robinson et al. (2014) proposed a quantitative measure, levels 
of remnant vegetation, as an indicator of potential biodiversity benefit, whereas Perry et al. 
(2016) measured bird, mammal and reptile richness and abundance under different fire 
regimes. Paul et al. (2016) combined various quantitative indicators into a biodiversity 
potential index, including the proportion of eucalypts in a planting and the width of the block. 
This drew on previous research that has shown diversity of birds and other fauna are higher in 
plantings where eucalypts are less dominant and where planting blocks are wider.  
 
Several studies employed qualitative indicators derived from stakeholder surveys or 
interviews. For example, Kragt et al. (2017) and Torabi et al. (2016) analysed the proportion 
of respondents identifying a potential co-benefit such as soil improvements or habitat 
provision as a driver for adoption of carbon farming, which could be used as a predictive 
indicator of co-benefit potential, albeit one based on social data (landholder perspectives) 
rather than biophysical data or modelling. Qualitative indicators proposed by Robinson et al. 
(2011) could be used to measure carbon farming impacts on Indigenous cultural assets and 
values (e.g. whether or not there was free and prior informed consent, whether local 
Indigenous people had control over benefit-sharing, and whether they reported increased 
quality of life as a result of the project). 




3. Metrics applied in other Australian market-based schemes 
This section reviews approaches and metrics applied in other Australian PES schemes (as 
examples of market-based mechanisms discussed in Section 1.1), as these appear the most 
relevant for the co-benefits of carbon farming in terms of the ecosystem services they cover, 
and the environmental, social and regulatory contexts in which they operate.  
 
Existing PES schemes that cover the key ecosystem services discussed in the previous section 
(i.e. biodiversity, soil and water health and cultural services) include a wide range of metrics, 
including indicators, models, benchmarks and indices. While PES schemes require at least one 
‘seller’ and one ‘buyer’ (Wunder 2005), they can take a variety of forms and vary in the extent 
to which they incorporate market-based elements such as substitutability and competition 
between buyers and sellers (Baumber 2017a). Three main categories of PES are identified 
based on their source of demand and transaction type (Madsen et al. 2010; Mercer et al. 2011): 
1. Public payments: Where government pays landholders to implement management practices 
that enhance ecosystem services;  
2. Compliance driven transactions: Where a market is established to achieve obligations 
imposed by government regulations (e.g. offset mechanisms, cap and trade markets); 
and  
3. Voluntary transactions: Where demand is not driven by compliance with regulations, but 
rather by private entities voluntarily seeking to enhance ecosystem service delivery for 
ethical, philanthropic, profit or consumptive motives.  
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Many of the Australian public payment schemes discussed in section 3.1 are state-based, 
including the BushTender program (Victoria), the Nature Assist program (Queensland) and the 
Environmental Services Scheme (NSW). This is also true of the compliance-driven markets 
discussed in section 3.2, including biodiversity offsets schemes in NSW and Victoria. Under 
these schemes, demand is created by regulations that require entities that wish to degrade native 
vegetation to purchase offsets. The voluntary transaction schemes discussed in section 4.3 have 
broader coverage, especially voluntary carbon market schemes that are global in scope but have 
relevance to Australia due to being listed as eligible to generate Verified Carbon Units under 
Australia’s National Carbon Offset Standard. 
 
3.1 Public payment markets 
While governments commonly provide grants and subsidies to encourage ecosystem service 
delivery, the degree to which these measures are ‘market-based’ depends on the levels of 
competition and substitutability they involve (Baumber 2017a). Conservation tenders have 
become one of the most common mechanisms for facilitating competition, primarily in relation 
to biodiversity, with almost 100 tenders conducted in Australia across various programs 
between 2001 and 2012 (Rolfe et al. 2017).  
 
The Bush Tender program in Victoria, which began in 2001, is a prominent example of a 
conservation tender that uses a reverse auction mechanism to promote competition. Interested 
landholders have their property assessed by a field officer who determines the value of the site 
in ‘habitat hectares’. This is based on its habitat score, an index that considers various habitat 
factors with differing weights (Fig. 5), with the maximum score of 100 corresponding to a 
mature, long-undisturbed site of the same vegetation type (DSE 2004). The habitat score is 
multiplied by the area being managed (in hectares) to determine habitat hectares. Proposed 
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management actions are also evaluated to assess the extent to which they are predicted to 
deliver a ‘gain’ in habitat hectares, with eligible actions including fencing to control access of 
stock or pests, managing weeds and pests, preserving trees and other biomass, and planting 




Fig. 5 Factors contributing to habitat score under Victoria’s habitat hectares metric (ELWP 
2017). 
 
Under the Bush Tender scheme, successful bidders offer the lowest price per unit gain 
measured in habitat hectares. The scheme employs an ‘input-based’ or ‘activity-based’ 
payment approach, where payments are linked to agreed actions, rather than an ‘outcome-
based’ or ‘performance payment’ approach that links payments to measured outcomes (Burton 
& Schwarz 2013; Börner et al. 2017). A similar reverse-auction process to increase habitat 
quality and protect high quality remnants and nationally threatened species and ecological 
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communities was applied in the Australia-wide Environmental Stewardship program that 
operated from 2007 to 2012 (Burns et al. 2016).  
 
In 2005, Victoria trialled an expansion of Bush Tender through the Eco Tender pilot program. 
This pilot scheme focused on a variety of environmental outcomes, including better water 
quality, reduced erosion, increased carbon sequestration and native vegetation. This kind of 
‘bundling’ approach recognises the synergies and trade-offs that can occur between different 
ecosystem services (Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010), whereby interventions around one service 
can impact the supply and use of other services and change the expression of the whole ES 
bundle (Vannier et al. 2019). Eco Tender’s eligible management activities were similar to Bush 
Tender, though the index used was multifunctional in the sense that it considered different 
environmental outcomes (e.g. biodiversity and erosion control) rather than just biodiversity. 
 
Further Australian experiences of bundled public payment PES schemes include the 
Queensland Nature Assist program (2007-2013) and the NSW Environmental Services Scheme 
(2003). Both schemes employed multifunctional indices to assess potential sites. The Nature 
Assist index includes site suitability, management suitability and contract security, with site 
suitability further divided into cultural heritage, catchment health, representativeness of 
biodiversity and rarity and distinctiveness of biodiversity (Hajkowicz et al. 2009). The NSW 
Environmental Services Scheme (ESS) used an Environmental Benefits Index to weigh up 
multiple benefits related to carbon sequestration, reduced salinity, improved biodiversity, 
mitigation of acid sulphate soils and improvement of soil retention and water quality (Grieve 
& Uebel 2003; Cowie et al. 2007).  Metrics developed through the ESS were subsequently 
incorporated into SCaRPA (Site and Catchment Resource Planning and Assessment), a related 
environmental benefits quantification system in NSW. The SCaRPA approach considered 
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factors such as salinity, land and soil, biodiversity (aquatic and terrestrial), carbon and cultural 
heritage (Summerell et al. 2011). It applied the Biodiversity Incentive Tool (BIT) that 
generated a score based on vegetation condition and connectivity to the surrounding landscape 
under the proposed management changes. This site-scale index was complemented by 
catchment-scale modeling using a Biodiversity Forecasting Tool (BFT), which modelled how 
small site-scale changes influence the status of biodiversity at the catchment scale, considering 
habitat condition and configuration. This approach was explicitly designed to consider 
cumulative and non-linear impacts, based on the notion that ‘the whole can be greater than the 
sum of its parts’ (Summerell et al. 2011). 
 
Noteworthy is also a pilot ground cover incentive program that operated across three properties 
of NSW between 2004 and 2008, as part of the Enterprise Based Conservation (EBC) program 
(Hacker et al., 2010). One key element that sets this scheme apart from most others discussed 
so far is that it employed outcome or performance-based payments, rather than payments based 
on inputs or activities undertaken. Participating landholders were paid based on the amount of 
ground cover on their properties relative to the rainfall conditions (including grasses, litter and 
cryptogamic crusts). For example, for landholders to receive 100% of their payment, they 
needed to maintain a ground cover of 40% in low-rainfall years (rainfall decile 6 or below), 
rising to a threshold of 70% in years where rainfall was in the top decile based on long-term 
rainfall records. Percentage ground cover was measured using a modified version of the step 
point method (Cunningham, 1962). A provision was included whereby the outcome-based 
payment system could be over-ridden where stock numbers were reduced to less than 10% of 
normal levels (an activity-based measure). 
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One scheme that is highly relevant, though at too early a stage to have produced measurable 
results, is the Queensland Government’s Land Restoration Fund specifically aimed at 
maximising the delivery of co-benefits from carbon farming. The initial funding round in 2018 
was made up of two grants programs: Kickstarting the Market and Catalysing Action 
(Queensland Government 2018). The former involves funding of pilot projects related to 
stakeholder engagement, analysis of business models and building understanding of carbon 
markets and carbon farming projects and risk management strategies. The latter focuses on ‘on-
ground’ demonstration projects, such as strategic environmental plantings or regrowth. Projects 
are favoured if they address specified priorities such as Great Barrier Reef protection, koala 
habitat or agricultural soil health, but the specific details of the metrics used to assess competing 
proposals have not been publicly released. Projects involving regrowth are also required to use 
a Regrowth Benefits Tool that produces scores for both estimated carbon and estimated 
biodiversity benefit (Queensland Government 2018). 
 
3.2 Compliance-driven markets 
The most relevant compliance-driven markets for the co-benefits of carbon farming in 
Australia are offset markets for biodiversity. The states of NSW and Victoria have each 
introduced offset schemes that allow developers wishing to undertake projects that degrade 
biodiversity to do so provided that they purchase offsets2 to cover their impact. These offsets 
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vegetation on their land by undertaking prescribed actions, or increase the level of protection 
by foregoing future opportunities to clear or degrade native vegetation. 
 
The NSW state government introduced its Biodiversity Offsets Scheme in 2017, replacing the 
BioBanking scheme adopted in 2008, which attracted criticism around its use of baselines, 
trade-offs and other factors (Maron et al. 2016). Biodiversity offsetting involves landholders 
entering into voluntary conservation covenants in perpetuity and earning  credits through 
eligible actions such as grazing management for conservation, weed control, ecological fire 
management, retention of regrowth, supplementary planting where natural regeneration is not 
sufficient, erosion control and the retention of dead timber and rocks (OEH 2014a). Credits can 
be sold to developers who are required to offset biodiversity impacts of their projects. If 
developers cannot find a suitable offset themselves or through a broker, they may pay into the 
Biodiversity Conservation Fund, with the Biodiversity Conservation Trust then taking 
responsibility for sourcing suitable offsets (OEH 2018). It is possible under the scheme for a 
single site to ‘generate both biodiversity credits and carbon credits through the same 
management actions’ (OEH 2014b p. 12).  
 
Accredited assessors use a prescribed BAM (Biodiversity Assessment Method) Calculator to 
calculate the number and type of credits that a landholder can generate from an offset site. The 
calculator takes into account the site context, vegetation type and proposed management 
practices. Specific factors included in the BAM calculator include biogeographic region, % 
native vegetation cover, key attributes (e.g. connectivity, outstanding biodiversity value), 
vegetation type, listing status (i.e. threatened or not) and changes in condition as a result of 
management actions, including scores for composition, structure and function with and without 
the proposed management actions (OEH 2017). Like-for-like provisions are incorporated 
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through two credit types: species credits, which cover impacts on specific threatened species, 
and ecosystem credits, which cover impacts on threatened ecosystems (Madsen et al. 2010). 
 
The State of Victoria first introduced offsetting under the Bushbroker scheme in 2006, with the 
present Native Vegetation Credits scheme governed by regulatory reforms in 2017. As with 
the NSW scheme, Victoria’s offset approach employs a like-for-like principle, with offsets 
divided into species offsets (where a rare or threatened species is affected) and general offsets 
(where no listed species are affected). Under Victoria’s scheme, landholders can generate 
credits by undertaking management actions that are predicted to generate a certain biodiversity 
‘gain’, using the habitat hectares metric discussed previously. Once a baseline score has been 
obtained, a predicted gain in site condition can be calculated based on the following gain 
categories (ELWP 2017): 
● Prior management gain: improvements delivered prior to registering the site as an offset 
● Security gain: when a landowner increases the protection of native vegetation 
● Maintenance gain: achieved by giving up currently allowed land uses and controlling 
threats that would otherwise cause a decline in native vegetation condition 
● Improvement gain: achieved from management commitments that are predicted to 
improve the site condition 
 
Once the gain in habitat hectares has been calculated, this is then multiplied by a landscape 
factor that considers the strategic value of the biodiversity in the landscape (using a Strategic 
Biodiversity Values Map that assigns each land unit in the state a value from 0 to 1). The final 
result is a value in either Species Habitat Units or General Habitat Units, which can then be 
traded to someone wishing to degrade a commensurate number of units. To ensure that offsets 
are located in areas with strategic biodiversity value that is comparable to the native vegetation 
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being removed, the strategic biodiversity value score of an offset must be at least 80 per cent 
of the strategic biodiversity value score of the native vegetation to be removed (ELWP 2017). 
 
The NSW Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme is an example of a compliance-based PES 
scheme that employs a cap-and-trade model (Selman 2009). Major emitters of salt into the 
Hunter River system are required to hold permits, with polluters who reduce their emissions 
able to sell their excess permits. Notable features of the scheme include a variable cap that can 
be lowered during periods of low flow and the direct monitoring of saline inputs into the river 
system at point sources (NSW EPA 2019). In contrast to the input-based payment approach 
used under most other PES schemes discussed so far, the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
employs an outcome-based approach that measures each participant’s impact directly.  
  
3.3 Voluntary markets 
While Australia’s government-funded ERF has a narrow focus on greenhouse gas emissions, 
there has been greater consideration of co-benefits in voluntary carbon markets. The Gold 
Standard and Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) can be used to certify carbon offsets under the 
National Carbon Offset Standard (Department of Environment and Energy 2018). The VCS 
acts as an umbrella standard and two of the schemes it covers have undertaken significant 
development of co-benefit benchmarks and indicators: the Climate, Community & Biodiversity 
Alliance (CCBA) and SocialCarbon. 
 
The CCBA standards have been developed by Conservation International, the Rainforest 
Alliance, the Wildlife Conservation Society and others to identify projects that contribute 
simultaneously to climate change mitigation, community development and biodiversity 
conservation (CCBA 2017). The standards require proponents to use ‘appropriate 
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methodologies’ to estimate changes based on the CCBA Social and Biodiversity Impact 
Assessment Manual (Richards and Panfil 2011). The manual suggests indicators for both 
biodiversity and community development, including ‘output indicators’ such as the number of 
trees planted, as well as ‘impact indicators’ such as the percentage increase in the population 
of an endangered species. The benchmark for certification is that monitoring is being 
implemented (i.e. input-based and qualitative) rather than participants having to meet 
quantitative, outcome-based benchmarks. 
 
SocialCarbon uses a six-factor framework (Social, Human, Financial, Natural, Biodiversity and 
Carbon) and offers a range of approved indicators that can be applied to each factor (using a 
scoring system from one to six). As with CCBA, certification is based on the implementation 
of monitoring and the selection of indicators rather than the scores obtained. However, the 
framework enables participants to benchmark themselves in a quantitative, outcome-based 
manner. For example, approved indicators relating to natural resources and biodiversity in 
forest projects that participants may choose from include (SocialCarbon 2011): 
1. Percentage of native ecosystems present and their connectivity (>50% and thoroughly 
interconnected = 6 points) 
2. Level of land degradation (>50% of area degraded = 2 points, voluntary recovery of 
degraded areas outside project site = 6 points)  
3. Level of ecological community degradation (totally degraded = 1 point, undisturbed = 6 
points) 
4. Species of conservation interest (complete absence = 1 point, several species with 
populations stable or growing = 6 points) 
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Aside from carbon offsets, voluntary markets have also emerged around other ecosystem 
services in Australia, particularly in relation to water quality. One example is the salinity credits 
trial in the Macquarie River catchment of NSW in the early 2000s. This trial involved an 
irrigators’ group, Macquarie River Food and Fibre Association (MRFFA), paying State Forests 
(a government-owned corporation) for salinity control services provided through plantation 
establishment in upstream groundwater recharge areas. With regards to metrics, Walsh et al. 
(n.d.) state that, while payment would have ‘ideally’ be based on the net reduction in recharge 
due to the planted forest (i.e. quantitative and outcome-based), payments were instead based 
on the estimated transpiration rate of the planted forest (i.e. a predictive proxy indicator based 
on modelling), as measurement of the actual water use of both the forest and the prior 
vegetation under the previous land use would incur ‘high compliance costs’. 
 
3.4 Summary of approaches and metrics from previous and current Australian PES schemes 
Table 3 provides a summary of how ecosystem services metrics have been employed in the 
PES schemes reviewed, using four main approaches: indicators, indices, benchmarks and 
models. Table 4 also indicates whether these approaches applied metrics in a predictive 
fashion (i.e. measuring an input or activity to predict outcomes) or involved measurement of 
actual outcomes (ie. Performance-based), and whether they are primarily quantitative or 
qualitative in nature. 
 
Table 3. Summary of approaches and metrics used in Australian PES schemes 
Type of metric Scheme 
Indicators 1. Habitat hectares (Victoria) – incorporates predictive indicators for 
tree canopy cover, understory and other factors 
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2. Macquarie salinity credits trial (NSW) – estimated transpiration rate 
used as predictive indicator of net reduction in recharge 
3. Ground cover incentive pilot scheme (NSW) - % ground cover used 
as outcome-based indicator 
4. Hunter river salinity scheme (NSW) – saline discharge recorded as 
outcome-based indicator at point sources 
5. Voluntary carbon certification (CCBA & SocialCarbon) – mix of 
indicators (activity-based, outcome-based, qualitative, quantitative) 
Indices 1. Bush Tender/Eco Tender/Native Vegetation Credits (Victoria) –
Biodiversity Benefits Index based on predictive scores across 
multiple habitat categories 
2. Environmental Services Scheme (NSW) – multifunctional 
Environmental Benefits Index incorporating predicted carbon 
sequestration, salinity, biodiversity, soil health and water quality 
3. Nature Assist (Queensland) – multifunctional index based on 
predictive scores for cultural heritage, catchment health and 
biodiversity 
Benchmarks 4. Ground cover pilot scheme (NSW) - % ground cover thresholds 
used as trigger for payments 
5. Voluntary carbon certification (CCBA & SocialCarbon) – 
qualitative benchmarks (monitoring implemented or not), with 
some optional quantitative benchmarks (SocialCarbon) 
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Models 6. Strategic Biodiversity Value Map (Victoria) and Biodiversity 
Forecasting Tool (NSW) – spatial mapping tools to predict where 
biodiversity benefit will be greatest 
7. BAM Calculator (NSW) – predictive modelling tool that 
incorporates site context, vegetation type and proposed 
management practices 
8. Offset and Impact Calculators of the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) offset policy. The 
tools compute habitat quality, time over which the loss is averted, 
time until ecological benefit of proposed offset is realised. 
9. Regrowth Benefits Tool (Queensland) – Predictive modelling tool 
with scores for both carbon and biodiversity benefit   
 
3. Discussion: Linking metrics and approaches to policy objectives 
Table 4 summarises key metrics identified from the review of previous studies (section 3) and 
PES schemes (section 3) and discusses their relevance for enhancing information on carbon 
farming co-benefits in Australia. Indicators have been subdivided into outcome-based and 
activity-based, while indices have been divided into those that focus on a single ecosystem 
service and those that are multifunctional. Fig. 6 matches these metrics to potential policy 
objectives relating to carbon farming co-benefits. The policy implications presented in Table 
4 and Fig. 6 are discussed further in sections 4.1 to 4.4 in relation to indicators, indices, 
benchmarks and models. 
Table 4. Approaches and metrics from PES,  relevant to carbon farming co-benefits in 
Australia. 
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Figure 6: Potential co-benefit approaches and metrics matched to different policy aims and 
purposes. The size of the circle indicates the relative importance of each metric to the desired 
aim/purpose. 
4.1 Indicators 
In relation to indicators, our review of existing PES schemes has demonstrated that those that 
can be measured at the design stage based on inputs or actions (i.e. input-based or activity-
based) are far more common in than direct, outcome-based or performance-based indicators. 
While some PES schemes, such as the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme and the ground 
cover incentive pilot scheme (both in NSW) have used outcome-based indicators, the 
biodiversity schemes reviewed employ activity-based indicators to predict biodiversity 
outcomes and the Macquarie salinity credits trial found that outcome-based indicators were 
nonviable due to the cost of monitoring (Walsh et al. n.d.). Börner et al. (2017) argues that 
linking landholder payments to outcome-based indicators is only appropriate in cases where 
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participants have a low risk-aversion, and external factors do not have a strong influence on 
the ability of landholders to provide positive environmental outcomes. In the arid and semi-
arid regions of Australia where much carbon farming has taken place to date, external factors 
such as fire and climate have been identified as major sources of risk affecting the ability of 
landholders to predict the level of co-benefit that carbon farming can deliver (Nolan et al. 2018; 
Nolan et al. 2019). 
 
Intermediate indicators or proxies may play a role in bridging the gap between activity-based 
and outcome-based indicators. In developing their biodiversity potential index, Paul et al. 
(2016) used the proportion of eucalyptus trees within a planting as a proxy for structural 
complexity and combined this with site width, which has shown a positive correlation to faunal 
diversity in previous studies (Munro et al. 2007). The Forest Stewardship Council (2018) has 
developed metrics such as a forest intactness index for biodiversity, and visual assessment 
protocols for soils and streams. Spatial models can also be used to produce indicators of 
biodiversity benefits based on factors such as remnant vegetation percentage, presence of 
threatened species or connectivity (e.g. Bryan et al. 2014; Robinson et al. 2016; Moran-
Ordonez et al. 2017). 
 
Outcome-based indicators are useful for verifying the effectiveness of carbon farming policies 
at state and national scales, as well as developing proxies, models and benchmarks. Such 
metrics may also be used as optional components of monitoring programs, as they are under 
voluntary standards such as CCBA and SocialCarbon. Remote sensing data could also be used 
to develop new indicators, such as the use of Landsat data to develop indicators of vertical 
foliage distribution in rangelands (Dean et al. 2015), which could in turn be linked to structural 
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complexity and related outcomes such as bird nesting and seedling establishment 




Given that the co-benefit concept involves a focus on multiple benefits, multifunctional 
indices covering a bundle of benefits would appear to be more relevant than single benefit 
indices (e.g. covering biodiversity only) for any new or adapted PES schemes that may be 
developed around carbon farming co-benefits in Australia. These indices could potentially be 
used to weigh up the relative co-benefits of different carbon farming projects competing for 
public funds, following examples such as Environmental Services and Nature Assist schemes 
in NSW and Queensland, respectively.  
 
As the ERF employs an auction-based system for selecting and assigning payments to carbon 
farming projects, a key question for policy-makers is whether it should be adapted to consider 
benefits other than just the amount of carbon sequestered by a project. One issue this would 
raise is that the ERF would no longer be delivering emissions abatement at the lowest cost to 
government, but rather would be aimed at delivering a bundle of environmental benefits in a 
cost-effective manner. The extent to which carbon abatement could be ‘traded off’ against 
other benefits in a multifunctional index would be a key consideration. However, as 
challenging as this approach may be, it is not impossible or without precedent. For example, 
the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) began in 1985 with a primary objective of 
reducing soil erosion on erodible cropland areas using an auction-based approach to achieve 
this in a cost-effective manner (Baylis et al. 2008). Additional environmental objectives were  
subsequently added in 1990 (Ribaudo et al. 2001), such that the CRP now aims to deliver a 
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bundle of environmental outcomes including wildlife, water quality and air quality benefits 
(Hajkowicz et al. 2009).  Similarly, renewable energy auctions, which often have climate 
change mitigation as a central objective, have been modified in countries such as China to 
include criteria relating to local economic benefit rather than just delivering the greatest 
amount of electricity generation per dollar spent (Azuela et al. 2014).  
 
Another precedent that could be drawn on from the renewable energy sector is the use of 
technology-specific auctions (Baumber 2017a), which could be reframed as method-specific 
auctions under the ERF. For example, some auctions could be open only to carbon farming 
that provides co-benefits (with a multifunctional index used to measure these) while other 
auctions would be open to other methods such as waste or energy efficiency (where no index 
would be applied). Alternatively, state and territory governments could develop their own 
auction schemes to source the voluntary carbon credits they are planning to purchase in 
coming years (Clean Energy Regulator 2019a). Given that many of the existing PES metrics 
used in Australia are state-specific (e.g. habitat hectares in Victoria, ecosystem and species 
credits in NSW, the Regrowth Benefits Tool in Queensland), incorporating co-benefits into 




Benchmarks can be used to guide landholders in designing and managing carbon farming 
projects and can also be used as threshold for payments related to co-benefits. While some 
voluntary carbon standards (e.g. CCBA, SocialCarbon) apply qualitative benchmarks for co-
benefits relating to biodiversity and community development (e.g. an appropriate monitoring 
plan has been implemented), these present a number of issues: 
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a)   benchmarks they impose are not quantitative,  
b) standards have not been designed for Australian conditions (Kapambwe and Keenan 
2009; Robinson et al. 2016) and  
c) the voluntary credit market is only 5% the size of the ERF market (Clean Energy 
Regulator 2019a).  
Torabi and Berkessey (2015) argue that the potential exists to create demand for bundled 
credits that promote both carbon and biodiversity through landscape-scale planning, building 
confidence in the market. Confidence could also be strengthened by developing Australia-
specific regeneration or afforestation standards that verify co-benefits using benchmarks drawn 
from the guidance provided by previous research on maximising outcomes for biodiversity, 
soil and water health (e.g. Lindenmayer & Hobbs 2004; Munro et al. 2012; Paul et al. 2016).  
 
State and territory governments represent a growing source of demand for voluntary carbon 
credits in Australia and also have policy objectives relating to biodiversity conservation, soil 
and water health, and Indigenous affairs. Policy decisions by state and territory governments 
to not only offset their emissions but to maximise co-benefits in doing so could create 
significant demand for certified multifunctional carbon credits that incorporate co-benefits. 
Any such approach would require updated standards, with the potential for both qualitative 
and quantitative benchmarks to be incorporated to guide the design and management of 
carbon farming projects to optimise co-benefits. 
 
Aside from their use in new or adapted PES schemes, benchmarks also have relevance for 
decision support tools for landholders wishing to maximise the co-benefits of carbon farming 
for private benefit. Previous studies have identified landholder motivations to engage in 
carbon farming due to its potential outcomes for biodiversity (Torabi et al. 2015; Cowie et al. 
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2019), soil condition (Kragt et al. 2017) and Indigenous connection to land (Robinson et al. 




Spatial modelling approaches are likely to be applicable to new or adapted PES schemes 
relating to co-benefits, as they feature strongly in both the co-benefits literature and existing 
PES schemes, particularly where biodiversity outcomes are a priority. Previous co-benefit 
studies have sought to identify priority sites for carbon farming based on biodiversity criteria, 
such as mapping ecosystems with less than 30% of their original vegetation remaining 
(Carwardine et al. 2015; Robinson et al. 2016), areas with high numbers of rare species 
occurring (Moran-Ordonez et al. 2017), and sites that score well in terms of complementarity, 
connectivity and representation (Bryan et al. 2014). As with benchmarks, these mapping tools 
may be of value to landholders weighing up a decision on whether to engage in carbon 
farming on their land. 
 
While spatial modelling based on remnant vegetation percentages and connectivity are 
applicable in highly fragmented landscapes, such approaches may not be directly applicable 
in rangeland areas of Australia with different fragmentation patterns. Alternative approaches 
to spatial mapping in rangelands could involve a focus on biodiversity refugia under future 
climate change scenarios (e.g. Gill et al. 2016) or identifying areas where the difference 
between the current state and the future state under carbon farming is likely to be greatest 
(e.g. the Regrowth Benefits Tool used under the Queensland Land Restoration Fund; 
Queensland Government 2018). 
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5.5 Principles for selection of metrics for co-benefits 
Based on the preceding discussion, the following principles are proposed for selecting 
metrics for assessing co-benefits of carbon farming.  
1. Apply metrics with the following attributes : 
o The metrics capture the relevant range of ecosystem services likely to be 
impacted (positively or negatively) by vegetation and soil management 
“carbon farming” projects (e.g. biodiversity conservation and habitat features; 
soil health/quality; hydrological impacts; economic and social/cultural 
benefits) ; 
o The metrics may include a single indicator or an array/composite; 
o The metrics may be quantitative or qualitative;  
o The metrics are responsive to the impacts of carbon farming and/or 
management (activity or outcome based); activity-based metrics are useful for 
slow response variables and/or when climatic conditions mask management 
impacts; 
o The metrics are readily and cost-effectively measured, interpreted, and 
independently verified; 
o The metrics are suited to, and tested in, an Australian context (environment, 
farming systems). 
2. Balance accuracy/precision and practicality, according to the purpose of assessment. 
Simple, less precise methods are suitable for predictive assessments to be used in 
project planning and voluntary market; whereas more accurate, precise methods are 
needed for market-based schemes involving  public payments,  or for offsets in 
compliance markets, for which fungibility (like-for-like substitution) is critical. 
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3. Consider limitations of indices that combine multiple ecosystem services (e.g . is 
weighting of variables to be avoided because it is perceived as being subjective; or 
should it be included because it allows the importance of an indicator to reflect the 
local site conditions?) Lack of explicit weighting can hide trade-offs. Prioritisation 
and weighting should be determined by stakeholders. 
4. Use single issue indices for combining different aspects of one impact category; e.g. 
aspects relevant for biodiversity conservation. 
5. Use proxies and models for predictive assessment, and where outcome-based 
measures are not feasible (e.g. due to transaction costs). Proxies and models should be 
developed and tested from direct measurements. 
6. Use multiple lines of evidence for quantifying selected variables (e.g. remote sensing 
and ground-based methods). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Australia has been an important site of policy innovation around carbon farming and the 
various ecosystem services it can provide, across both the Oceania region and the world more 
broadly. Australia’s policy experimentation around land-based carbon sequestration has 
spawned a diverse and evolving carbon farming sector that has the potential to deliver a range 
of co-benefits aside from climate regulation, including in relation to biodiversity, soil health, 
water quality and cultural services. The quantities and types of ecosystem services that are 
currently being delivered are subject to substantial uncertainty, as are the methods that may 
be most appropriate for quantifying these services. Evidence from previous studies on 
reforestation and regeneration has been used to develop design principles and management 
practices that are likely to maximise these co-benefits. Moreover, existing PES schemes in 
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Australia present a range of ways of linking such practices to landholder payments, including 
through the use of indicators, indices, benchmarks and models. 
 
Given the existing policy environment for carbon farming in Australia, benchmarks and 
spatial models that prioritise certain areas for carbon farming are likely to provide the most 
immediate benefits by supporting landholders in maximising co-benefits for private benefit, 
achieving certification under existing voluntary schemes that value co-benefits (e.g. CCBA, 
SocialCarbon) and earning additional payments from other PES schemes (e.g. biodiversity 
offset schemes). Multifunctional indices have been developed in Australia previously and 
have the potential to play a role in new or adapted PES schemes that target the co-benefits of 
carbon farming. Spatial models and predictive indicators that link design and management 
actions to likely outcomes could be incorporated into multifunctional indices, as well as being 
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Used Polglase et al. 
(2013) and measured 
the potential carbon that 
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Modelled using a 
prioritisation approach 













Water yield  Theorised from previous 
studies. Outlined 
conceptual model for 
balancing carbon, 
biodiversity and water 
outcomes. 
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willingness to pay for 
co-benefits) 







 Habitat for 
biodiversity 
  Direct sampling of 202 
sites.  
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et al. 2016 
Case study 









Livestock shelter  Case study approach 
using on-ground 
modelling to measure 
livestock (using 
GrassGro, a mechanistic 
model containing 
interacting modules for 
climate, soil dynamics, 
pasture growth and 
animal production) and 
soil and tree 
sequestration of carbon 
(using FullCAM). 
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measurement of area of 
carbon plantings (with 
assumption that benefit 
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 Habitat for 
biodiversity 
 
  Biodiversity potential 
index developed based 
on proportion of 
eucalypts and site width 
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priority locations (with 
assumption that benefit 
is greatest where rare 
species are present) 
Indigenous 
management: Theorised 
from previous studies 
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